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Abstract: Educational expansion followed by economic decline in Kenya has been associated with a decline in
the social return to secondary education, conventionally calculated, from 20% in 1978 to 6% in 1995. Wage
benefits from primary school have fallen but returns remain unchanged because of correspondingly falls in
costs. Returns to tertiary education have not fallen. The concept of expected returns to education is introduced
to allow for effects of education on earnings from self-employment and on the probability of employment.
These mirror conventionally calculated returns for men, but are higher for women due to large participation
effects of education.Contents
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1. Introduction
It is now conventional wisdom to stress the importance of education, a measure of  human capital
accumulation, in determining growth. This emphasis has been given fresh impetus by endogenous
growth theories (eg Lucas, 1988) but is also evident in applications of the augmented Solow
model (eg Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). At the microeconomic level, conventional estimates
of returns to education have been used to support calls for governments, particularly in
developing countries, to prioritise educational spending. In the most recent in a series of four
influential surveys of the literature on these estimates,  the average social rate of return to primary
education has been put at 18% (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Although the consensus surrounding the
role of education in growth is widespread, it masks important empirical controversies. No robust
estimate of the effect of education has yet been agreed upon in the macroeconomic literature on
growth (compare the large positive effects of Gemmell, 1996, with the zero effect found by
Pritchett, 1996, on virtually identical data). Conventional estimates at the microeconomic level
do exhibit more robust regularities, although debates arise over how these regularities should be
interpreted (Glewwe, 1996). 
Sub-Saharan Africa provides an important test-bed for disputes about the role of education in
economic growth. After independence, it undertook a major educational expansion but
experienced economic slowdown in the 1960s followed by stagnation in the 1970s and decline
post-1980. The experience on the subcontinent makes less surprising Pritchett￿s (1996) finding
that there is no cross-country correlation between economic growth post-1960 and educational
expansion, even after controlling for accumulation of physical capital. Despite this macroeconomic
experience, it is commonly argued - based on the conclusions of Psacharopoulos - that
microeconomic estimates of returns to education in Africa are very high and higher than for other
regions of the world. This conclusion is rendered unsafe after a persuasive critique by Bennell
(1995), who shows Psacharopoulos￿s findings for Africa to be heavily influenced by a few dated
studies using very poor data. Estimates of conventional Mincerian rates of return to schooling in
Africa made since 1980 have shown more modest effects (Appleton, 1999). What remains unclear
is whether this reflects a fall in returns to education or whether returns were never as high as
asserted by Psacharopoulos. 
In this paper, we look at microeconomic evidence on changes in returns to education over time
in one country in sub-Saharan Africa, namely Kenya. Although it is hard to identify any one
country as representative of the subcontinent, Kenya is not atypical. Like the subcontinent as a
whole it has experienced educational expansion and poor economic performance. At present,
Kenya￿s educational achievements are above the average for the subcontinent (an illiteracy rate
of 22% in 1995 compared to 44% in the subcontinent as a whole) while its income is below
average (in 1997 its GNP per capita in PPP terms (1987 dollars) was $1110 compared to $1470
in the subcontinent; World Bank, 1998). The empirical contribution of this paper is to show how
returns to schooling in Kenya have changed during the last two decades of educational expansion
and economic decline. This is done using survey data from 1978, 1986 and 1995. To anticipate
the findings of the paper, we reveal a dramatic fall in the returns to secondary schooling, although
not to primary or tertiary education. We show that returns to secondary schooling may indeed
have been very high in the 1970s, as indicated by some of the studies reported by Psacharopoulos.
However, we do not corroborate his claim that the conventional returns to education were then
or are now highest at the primary level. A byproduct of the analysis is documentation of a1 In 1966, the Kenyan education system was changed from eight years (￿Standards￿) of primary
education to seven years. Secondary education comprised six years (￿Forms￿): four years of lower and two
years of upper secondary education. University undergraduate degrees were supposed to take three years. This
system was altered again in 1985 to an 8-4-4 system (meaning eight years of primary, four years of secondary
and four years of university education).
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dramatic fall in urban real wages during the period. This contradicts the predictions of some of
the models of the early 1970s inspired by Kenyan labour markets, which posted urban real wage
to be rigid downwards (Harris and Todaro, 1990). 
A methodological contribution of the paper is to generalise conventional rate of return estimates
to include urban self-employment as well as wage employment. One common critique of
conventional rate of return to education estimates is that they are based on urban wage
employees. This may be appropriate for males in industrialised countries, but is questionable in
developing countries where most of the population depend on self-employment. We address this
concern by introducing the concept of the ￿expected return to education￿ - the derivative of
expected income with respect to education, where expected income is defined as the conditional
expectation of earnings from an activity (wage employment or self-employment) weighted by the
probability of engaging in such an activity. For the years for which we have data, we find rates
of return to education within self-employment are comparable to those for wage employment.
Education does have strong effects on the probability of employment and self-employment, an
effect missed by conventional analysis of returns within employment (or self-employment) alone.
However, earnings differentials between the two kinds of activity are not sufficiently large to
make this a major consideration for men. For women, low rates of labour market participation
imply that education may have a much stronger effect on earned income than implied by
conventional estimates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the Kenyan
economy during the period, reviews the changes in the education system in Kenya and the nature
of its urban labour markets. Section 3 discusses the data and econometric specification. The core
results on the determinants of earnings are discussed in section 4. Section 5 takes the estimated
wage benefits of education and adds data on direct costs to estimate full rates of return. The
analysis for the first two surveys is extended in section 6 to incorporate self-employment and,
finally, the conclusions are in section 7. 
2.   Background 
Since Independence in 1963, there has been a rapid expansion of education in Kenya (Table 1
refers). Student enrollments in primary and secondary schools increased from 0.9 and 0.03 million
in 1963 to 5.5 and 0.6 million in 1995, respectively. At the primary level the expansion was partly
due to free primary education introduced in 1974. At the secondary level, much of  the expansion
was through the establishment of community self-help (Harambee) schools which educated around
half the secondary school students enrolled in the 1970s. Rapid expansion in university education
took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the establishment of four more universities and
a double intake of undergraduates as a result of reforming the educational system
1. 2  National accounts data comes from IMF (various) and population data from the World Bank  (1998).
We measure prices in Kenya using the official consumer price indices for Nairobi (Central Bank of Kenya,
various). We take a weighted average of the three CPIs for low, middle and high income groups (the weights
are taken from the revised CPI: 0.768 for low income, 0.209 for middle and 0.023 for high; the old CPI was an
unweighted average of the three separate indices). The CPI was revised in 1990, with values for both the old
and revised series existing for that year. For 1978 and 1986, we take the values of the old CPI (relative to
1990); for 1995, we take the value of the revised CPI (relative to that for 1990). This gives figures of 28.9 for
1978, 70.3 for 1986 and 287.1 for 1995 (with 1990=100). That prices did rise roughly ten-fold during the
period is supported by reports of market and producer prices for basic food items such as maize, beans and
milk (Republic of Kenya, various).
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Table 1: Education enrolments in Kenya
Enrolments 1960 1970 1978 1986 1995
Primary ￿000s 781 1428 2995 4702 5536
Gross Ratio  47 58 91 94 85
Secondary ￿000s 20.1 129.8 370.5 457.8 632.4
Gross Ratio  2 9 18 20 24
Tertiary ￿000s - - 9.9 21.8 41.8
Gross Ratio  0 1 1 1 2
Source: World Bank (various), UNESCO (various)
Despite this educational expansion, Kenya￿s economic performance has been disappointing. The
year of the first survey analysed in this paper, 1978, was the high water mark of Kenya￿s
economy. In the decade before Independence in 1963, the manufacturing sector in Kenya had
enjoyed substantial growth in output and large gains in labour productivity.  In the period 1954-
64, manufacturing output in Kenya grew by 7.6% and labour productivity by 8.7% (Harris and
Todaro, 1969). In the next decade, growth was steady, with per capita real GDP growing at 3%
per annum. The first oil shock brought recession but this was soon outweighed by the 1976-78
boom caused by the temporary rise in the price of the main export - coffee. Perhaps the best single
measure of living standards is real private consumption per capita. This  peaked in 1978 and by
1995 had fallen by a quarter (Table 2 refers)
2. The decline appears to have been fairly steady: real
private consumption per capita fell by 14% between the first and the second surveys used here
(1978-1986) and by 13% between the second and third surveys (1986-1995). These falls in
average living standards reflect a failure to keep up with the rise in population, which increased
by 74% during the period.
In this paper we focus on the urban labour market in Kenya. Rural labour markets are less
developed than urban ones, with most rural dwellers working their own small holdings. There has
been a rapid increase in the supply of labour in urban labour markets. In part, this is driven by high
population growth. In addition, female urban labour market participation has increased
substantially. Finally, there is considerable rural-urban migration. Urbanisation rose from 8% in
1962 to 15% in 1978, 21% in 1986 and 29% in 1995 (World Bank, 1998). These factors imply
an increase in the supply of urban labour which, given the poor growth performance, was not
matched by demand. For competitive labour markets, this would imply a fall in real wages.4
However, some  theories inspired by Kenya￿s labour markets posited an urban wage that was rigid
downwards (Harris and Todaro, 1970). In practice, although there are imperfections in Kenya￿s
labour markets, these have not been sufficient to prevent wages responding to supply outstripping
demand. Official statistics imply that earnings fell by 35% between 1978 and 1995 (Table 2
refers). This fall is greater than the general fall in living standards noted above in the private
consumption figures.
Table 2: Changes in wages over time in Kenya, official sources
Year Wages per employee 
















1978 3051 3565 1209 5620 28.94 15.36
1986 2707 3371 919 4840 70.26 20.68
1995 1977 2232 663 4210 287.10 26.69
Sources: Wage data from Republic of Kenya  (various years); private consumption from IMF (1996); population data from
World Bank (1998); CPI constructed from old and revised CPIs as detailed in footnote 2.
3.  Data and methods 
We compare data from three surveys: the 1978 Labour Force Survey; the 1986 Urban Labour
Force Survey and the 1995 Regional Programme on Enterprise Development survey. The first
two surveys are fairly similar, both being household-based and drawn from a national sample
frame by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The  RPED survey was enterprise-based, surveying 218
manufacturing firms from four sub-sectors (food, textile, wood and metal) in Nairobi, Mombasa,
Nakuru and Eldoret. We focus on urban wage employees aged 15 to 64 years (the working age
bracket in Kenya). The three surveys provide reasonably large samples after cleaning the data:
1331 workers in 1978, 2494 in 1986 and 1123 in 1995. However, the two labour force surveys
provide much smaller numbers of manufacturing workers (Table 3 refers). The number who come
from the same sub-sector and location as those in the RPED are even smaller. The potential
problem in comparing the RPED with the two LFSs is an issue we return to below.
The impact of Kenya￿s educational expansion is evident in the rise in the level of education of the
workforce over time (Table 3 refers). The proportion of manufacturing workers with no schooling
fell from 14% in 1978 to 7% in 1986 and 3% in 1995. The proportion of manufacturing workers
with complete lower secondary schooling (Form 3-4 or higher) rose from 29% in 1978 to 38%
in 1986 and to 44% in 1995. New entrants to wage employment are much more likely to have
secondary education than experienced cohorts. In 1978, only 21% of workers with less than nine
years of experience had secondary schooling compared to  70% of more experienced workers.
However, the proportion of workers in the recent cohorts with only primary schooling may be
stabilising. In both 1986 and 1995, 26% of those with less than nine years of experience did not
have secondary education. As with the official statistics, our data reveal a sharp fall in real wages
between 1978 and 1995. Mean wages for manufacturing workers in comparable sub-sectors and5
Table 3: Education and earnings; survey data 
Variables





Mean earnings (1990 KShillings per month)





NA 2983 NA NA 2027































































- - - - 2311
(3%)
polytechnic - - - - 4868
(3%)





















16.85 16.38 15.27 14.84 16.25
male 0.85 0.89 0.75 0.89 0.85
no. of obs. 1331 186 2494 312 11233 Potential experience is an estimate of the number of years since the age of fifteen that an individual
has not been in full-time education Based partly on the ages of students in the LFS 1986, we assume the
following ages of entry to the labour force:
primary school leavers 15 years or earlier
forms 1-2 17 years
forms 3-4 or vocational 19 years
forms 5-6 21 years
college, polytechnic & professional 22 years
university 25 years 
4 This approximation would be exact if the direct costs of schooling are zero, individuals live for ever
and schooling generates a constant proportionate wage premium (as in equation 1).
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 locations were 32% lower in 1995 than in 1978. We do not have survey data on general wages
in 1995, but it seems likely that they have fallen along with wages in manufacturing. Both our data
and official statistics show manufacturing wages falling slightly less than general wages between
1978 and 1986; official statistics imply that manufacturing wages fell slightly more than general
wages between 1986 and 1995. The fall in wages was not uniform for employees of different
levels of education. Those with secondary schooling suffered the largest falls in real wages. Mean
wages for those with 3-4 years of secondary schooling in the RPED are 61% lower than those for
comparable manufacturing workers in 1978. The wages for those without education have fallen
by only 11%, but this probably partly reflects a change in their age composition. For primary
completers, wages were reduced by 36% between 1978 and 1986.
 We follow Mincer (1974) in estimating a semi-logarithmic equation for the determinants of
earnings: 
ln (Wi) = " +  3$kSik +  (1Ai +  (2Ai
2 + (3Ai
3 + *Zi + Ui (1)
where W is earnings per worker i; Sk is a 0-1 dummy variable for being educated at least up to
level k, A is potential experience
3; Z a vector of control variables(sex and location) and U an error
term. 
Our interest in estimating equation (1) is to calculate the rate of return to education, RORE.
Estimates of the RORE conventionally measure the benefits of education in the form of higher
wages relative to the combined opportunity and direct costs of acquiring education. Private
ROREs include only private benefits and costs; social ROREs as reported by Psacharopoulos
(1994) and others differ only in including the direct costs of education to the government as well
as benefits in terms of higher taxes. Where the direct costs are low, a useful approximation to the
RORE is the Mincerian return to education, which is the increment in earnings expressed as a
proportion of wages forgone
4. Given equation (1), if the level of education k comprises Ek years
of education, the Mincerian RORE to each of those years of schooling is:
RORE /[(Wik - Wik-1)/Wik-1]/Ek
= (exp($k)-1)/Ek (2)5 One way to control for many unobservables is to study the earnings differences of twins (Ashenfelter
and Krueger, 1994; Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman,1994; and Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). Ashenfelter
and Rouse (1998) conclude: ￿All of these studies find that once estimates are adjusted for measurement error,
the fixed effects are insignificantly different from the OLS estimates.￿
6 For rural areas, it is likely that returns to education within agriculture are lower but this may be offset
by greater benefits of education in terms of access to off-farm income (see Appleton, 1999).
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Such conventional estimates of ROREs have been widely criticised in the literature. Perhaps the
two most widespread and important criticisms are that conventional earnings functions such as
(1) do not provide consistent estimates of the wage benefits of education and that, anyway, such
benefits are too narrowly construed to be of much interest, for example to policymakers. On the
first issue, there are concerns that correlations between education and unobservables  - such as
pre-existing worker ability, health, family background and school quality - may render the
estimates of $ misleading. This paper cannot address this issue, since - in common with most
conventional studies - our data does not include measures of such variables. However, several
￿unconventional￿ studies suggest that standard rate of return estimates may not be wholly
misleading
5. Furthermore, the changes in the partial associations between schooling and wages
which we identify are sufficiently large to be of interest, although readers should bear in mind the
serious caveats surrounding their interpretation.  On the second issue, there is a concern that wage
benefits are purely private monetary gains and do not capture possible external benefits and/or
non-monetary benefits, in terms of improved child health or the intrinsic value of education. These
issues are clearly important for policy but raise as yet unresolved questions and go far beyond the
scope of this paper. For example, there is virtually no empirical literature on how to measure
income externalities from education and to the extent that non-monetary benefits can be
quantified, it is far from clear how if at all they should be valued in monetary terms. Rate of return
estimates based on private income benefits from education remain of interest for several reasons.
Households often seem to evaluate schooling decisions in terms of their benefits to future income.
If these benefits turn out to be very low, then policies advocating the use of education services
as part of a poverty alleviation package may be ill-conceived. Moreover, if these rates of return
are very high, that is prima facie evidence that individuals are not able to obtain the optimal
amount of education - perhaps due to credit constraints and other market imperfections.
This paper is able to address two other criticisms of conventional rate of return estimates. The
first is that conventional rate of return estimates assume existing wage differentials will persist
indefinitely, rather than respond to changes in labour market conditions. By comparing estimates
at different points in time, we are able to examine how serious this problem may be. The second
is that wage benefits are of dubious relevance in poor countries such as Kenya where most people
depend on income from self-employment, not wages. Since we have data on income from self-
employment for the first two of our data-sets, we are able to address this issue at least for urban
areas for those two years
6. To do this, we focus on expected income, defined as:
E(Yi) = E(Wi | Wi>0).Pr(Wi>0) + E(Ri |Ri>0).Pr(Ri>0) (3)
The expected return to a marginal change in education is:
*E(Yi)/*E = Pr(Wi>0).*E(Wi | Wi>0)/*E i+ E(Wi.| Wi>0).*Pr(Wi>0)/*Ei7 In the empirical analysis, we do not apply equation (5) since the changes in education we consider are
not marginal. Instead, we directly compute expected earnings for workers with different levels of education and
calculate rates of return from these.
8 Ideally, it would be desirable to have variables which might affect allocation into activities and not
wages, in order to identify selectivity effects. However, the surveys did not provide such variables. A handful of
individuals reports earnings from both wages and self-employment, but these are too few to model and are
dropped from the empirical work.
9 An upper limit of 9999 was set on reported earnings in 1978 (only), presumably because only four
digits were allowed in the data entry procedure for the earnings variable. Twenty-one workers were entered
with incomes at the upper limit of 9999: eleven were university graduates (21% of all university graduates in
the sample), nine had attained Forms 3-4 (3% of all Form 3-4 graduates) and one had only Standards 5-8
(0.2% of Standard 5-8 graduates). We excluded such observations from 1978. To explore the likely biased
caused by having to exclude these highest earning observations, we imposed similar truncation on the 1986
LFS. That is to say we excluded the highest earning 21% of university graduates; for those with Form 3-4 and
8
 +  Pr(Ri>0).E(Ri.|Ri>0)/*Ei + E(Ri.|Ri>0).*Pr(Ri>0)/*Ei. (4)
Conventional rate of return estimates focus on *E(Wi| Wi>0)/*E i. The expected rate of return
weights this by the probability of being in employment, augments it by a corresponding term for
the return within self-employment weighted by the probability of being in self-employment and
then adds terms for the effects of education on the probabilities of being in employment and self-
employment, weighted by the returns in those activities
7. We model the probability of being in
employment, self-employment or other activity by a multinomial logit: 
Pr(Wi>0) = exp(BwQi)/exp(BwQi + BrQi)
Pr(Ri>0) = exp(BrQi)/exp(BwQi + BrQi)
Pr(Wi=0, Ri=0) = 1/exp(BwQi + BrQi)( 5 )
where Q is a vector of explanatory variables, Bw and Br two vectors of coefficients. The
explanatory variables are assumed to be the same as those which determine wages (education,
experience, sex, location)
8. The multinomial model could be given a theoretical justification as the
outcome of stochastic utility maximisation. However, we do not assume this in our interpretation
in order to allow for the possibility of involuntary unemployment and other constraints on choice.
4.  Mincerian returns to education 
Education, potential experience, sex and location explain around half of the variance in the log
of real monthly earnings in the LFSs and just more than a third in the RPED (Table 4 refers). The
implied Mincerian returns to schooling are reported in Table 5. Mincerian rates of return to
secondary education for the general sample (all cohorts combined) were very high in 1978,
standing at 42% for the first four years (￿lower secondary￿ school) and 28% for the final two
(￿upper secondary￿ school). The Mincerian RORE at the primary and tertiary levels were more
modest, at 8% and 15% respectively. However, the latter figure is an underestimate due to a data
problem; the true figure may be considerably higher
9. Mincerian returns to schooling have fallenStandards 5-8, the exclusions were 3% and 0.2%. The effect of this truncation was to lower the Mincerian
RORE at the university level  in 1986 from 30% to 21%. For other levels of education, the impact of such
truncation was negligible. This suggests that the true Mincerian rate of return to university education in 1978
may have been 50 percent larger than our estimates in Table 5.
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over time. In 1986, this was only visible at the lower secondary school level amongst the full
sample of all employees. The secondary RORE fell from 42% to 26%, a statistically significant
fall. However, for the subset of employees in manufacturing there appears to have been a more
general fall in the returns to schooling. Returns to primary and lower secondary schooling for
manufacturing workers were half what they were in 1978.  In 1995 the Mincerian RORE for
manufacturing workers stood at 2% for primary school and 12% for secondary school. It appears
that the return to primary education in manufacturing had halved again between 1986 and 1995,
whilst that to lower secondary schooling had fallen by a quarter. In contrast to schooling,
university appeared to give high returns in 1995 with a Mincerian RORE of 69%.
The simple specification of the earnings function in (1) is restrictive in implying that the
percentage return to experience is invariant to education. A less restrictive approach is to estimate
earnings functions separately for sub-samples with different levels of education. We did this for
the uneducated, for ￿primary completers￿ (those with Standards 5-8 only) and for ￿secondary
completers￿ (forms 3-4). Figures 1-3 plot the earnings profiles predicted by these models,
evaluated at the means of the other explanatory variables (sex and location). In all three surveys,
the return to experience is higher for secondary completers than others. Secondary completers
with five years potential experience are predicted to earn 157% (120%) more than primary
completers in 1978 (1986); for those with twenty-five years experience, the figure is 167%
(137%). For the uneducated, earnings do not noticeably increase with experience once it reaches
15 years. For primary completers, there continues to be a positive relation until around 30 years
of experience. For secondary completers, experience appears to continue bringing substantial
returns throughout the working life. Nonetheless, comparing the three figures, the narrowing gap
between the earnings of secondary and primary completers is apparent. In the RPED, secondary
completers with five years experience have only 44% higher earnings than primary completers;
for those with 25 years experience, the figure is 71%. Only when considering those with even
higher experience, do we see secondary completers earning double the income of primary
completers.
Estimating earnings functions for particular age cohorts, it is seems that those who received
secondary education in the 1960s or earlier have been protected to a degree against falling returns.
The pre-Independence cohort enjoyed a 45% wage premium per year of lower secondary school
in 1978; by 1986 this had been eroded to 35% and by 1995, those in manufacturing received 34%.
For  those who entered the labour market in 1963-70, the wage  premium to lower secondary
schooling fell from 42% in 1978 to 29% in manufacturing in 1995. Although these are substantial
falls, the wage premium remained substantial even in the 1990s. By contrast, among those
entering the labour market after 1970, there is little evidence of ￿vintage￿ effects of secondary
education. In 1986, the Mincerian returns to secondary education varied little between the 1971-
78 cohort and the 1979-1986 cohort. Furthermore, the Mincerian return to secondary education10






































































































Table 4: Earnings functions for wage employees (log monthly earnings 1990 prices)
Variables



































































- - - - 0.507
(5.18)
polytechnic - - - - 0.507
(4.01)






































































































no. of obs. 1331 186 2494 312 1123
adjusted R
2 0.474 0.491 0.533 0.479 0.350
mean lnw  7.870 7.816 7.508 7.519 7.33112
Table 5: Mincerian returns to education over time 
Survey Cohort Primary S8 Secondary F4 University
LFS 1978
all employees
1962 and earlier 7 45 13
1963-1970 10 42 13
1971-1978 3 38 22




All cohorts 10 34 61
LFS 1986
all employees
1962 and earlier 13 35 49
1963-1970 8 32 18
1971-1978 4 25 16
1979-1986 7 31 52




All cohorts 5 16 20
RPED 1995 1962 and earlier 1 34 NA
1963-1970 -13 29 NA
1971-1978 4 8 100
1979-1986 6 10 103
1987-1995 2 11 63
All cohorts 2 12 69
Assuming 7 years to complete primary; 4 for lower secondary; 2 for higher secondary and 4 for university
Cohorts defined by the year when an individual is predicted to enter the labour force.
NA = not available (no university graduates in cohort in survey)
 was similar for the three youngest cohorts in 1995. The fact that the wage premium to secondary
education was similar across cohorts in 1978 would seem to rule out some otherwise plausible
explanations for why the premium in the 1980s and 1990s was lower for younger cohorts. In
particular, it makes it hard to argue that the higher premium for older cohorts reflects their having
received higher quality schooling or schooling with a higher signalling value. Instead, it may be
that Africanisation and economic growth in the 1960s allowed educated workers to secure
positions that were to some extent protected from competition from the increased supply of
educated labour in subsequent decades.
 It is clear from our results that conventional rate of return estimates are subject to severe
limitations when based on wage patterns at a given point in time. Consider what the wage patterns
in 1978 implied for the 1979-86 cohort. Someone entering the labour market with four years of
secondary schooling in 1979 might expect - based on wage patterns in 1978 for the 1971-197810 A complicating issue is the treatment of the Student Loan Scheme, which was introduced in the 1990s
and provides loans to university students at 2% interest to cover fees, board and lodging and bookstore
accounts. Following Demery and Verghis (1994), we treat these loans as a disguised grant, since there was
little evidence of more than token repayments at the time Demery and Verghis wrote. If the loans are regarded
as genuine transfers, the cost per university student to the government would fall by around 32%. 
11  According to UNESCO, student-teacher ratios fell between 1978 and 1990 from 33 to 31 at the
primary level amd remained constant (at 41) at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, student-teacher ratio
rose only slightly from 7.1 in 1980 to 8.1 in 1990 (UNESCO, various years; Wolff, 1984).
12  In 1992/3, labour costs accounted for 90-95% of educational expenditures at the primary level and
85-90% at the secondary level.
13  One might expect private direct costs to have risen with the increased emphasis on cost-sharing. This
implies our estimates of the fall in the return to schooling over time might be underestimated.
13
cohort - to have a 151% wage premium over a primary school completer with the same
experience. In 1986, the actual premium would have been 126%, in 1995, it was only 41%. 
5. Full returns to education; incorporating pecuniary costs
Mincerian rates of return assume the only cost of education is foregone wages, the opportunity
cost. Data on direct costs paid by the government are available from official sources (Table 6
refers)
10. At the primary level, the costs fell by more than two-fifths between 1978 and 1995; at
the university level they have fallen by more than three fifths. At the secondary level, the fall is
more modest, at less than one eighth. These falls are not due to rising student-teacher ratios
11.
Instead, they reflect the fall in real wages described above, since labour costs account for the bulk
of educational expenditures
12. There is less information available on the private pecuniary costs
of schooling in Kenya. Perhaps the most reliable source of information is that from the 1992/93
Welfare Monitoring Survey, reported by Demery and Verghis (1994). This can be used to
estimate mean household educational expenditures per student for each level of schooling. Private
spending per student is ten times as high at the secondary level as at the primary level. This
reflects the fact that fees are not supposed to be charged by state primary schools, but account
for 84% of household educational expenditure on secondary school students. Households actually
spend less per student on university students than on secondary school students, although the
figures understate ultimate costs if student loans are actually repaid. We take the Demery and
Verghis estimates of the real private pecuniary costs of education in 1992/93 and assume that
costs were constant at that level throughout the period 1978-95. There is little data which to test
this assumption, with none for the primary and university level
13. At the secondary level, there are
two other sources of information: an estimate for 1979 by Armitage and Sabot (1984) and those
from a survey of rural households in Central Province in 1982 (Bevan, Collier and Gunning,
1989). These two sources differ, but average out at a similar figure in real terms to that of Demery
and Verghis. 
One way to gauge the relative importance of the direct costs of education is to compare them with
average earnings, an indicator opportunity costs. At the primary level, the annual direct private
costs appear very small: 2% of the mean earnings of uneducated workers in 1978. At the
secondary level, direct private costs are more substantial: 14% of the mean earnings of primary14
educated manufacturing workers in 1978, rising to 25% in 1995. University direct private costs
are only 4% of the mean earnings of employees with Form 4, rising to 10% in 1995. Total direct
costs are substantial for university, remaining roughly constant during the period at slightly under
twice the mean earnings of those with Form 4. 
Table 6: Estimates of  the pecuniary costs of schooling (1990 shillings per student per year)
Primary Secondary University Notes
Public
1968






1698 3714 122014 Sub-sectoral shares
estimated as an average of
1976 and 1980 values
1986
UNESCO
1374 3740 66510 Estimated as an average







(Carnoy and Thias, 1971)















424 4344 2400 Not including liability
from university  Student
Loan Scheme
Note: In 1995/96, total expenditure was 21% higher than recurrent expenditure at the university level; at the primary level it
was 2.4% higher; at the secondary level it was 0.6% higher. These figures were used to adjust upwards the UNESCO statistics,
which  included recurrent expenditure only.
We can combine this data on costs with estimates of the wage benefits of education to yield full
estimates of the rate of return to education. The rate of return to education is that which equates
the net present value of the earnings stream of the educated, less direct costs, to the earnings
stream of the uneducated. As is conventional, we estimate earnings streams using data on wage
employees. We assume that individuals not in education are  wage employment from age 15 to
55 (only) and that they do not earn income from other activities at any time. Implicitly this
assumes that there is no opportunity cost to schooling for children under 15 (the primary school
going ages). This is certainly untrue for rural Kenya, where children do provide labour for
household activities. However, it may be a reasonable approximation for urban Kenya where
school may even provide a valuable benefit to some households simply by providing child care.
To allow for experience-earnings interactions, we estimate equation (2) for each education14  This conclusion is based on a comparison of all employees in LFS 1978 with manufacturing workers
only in the RPED 1995. However, it is likely to be valid: Mincerian returns fell even more when comparing the
RPED with just manufacturing workers in LFS 1978 than when comparing it with all employees in 1978.
15 In the 1995 RPED, only 1.1% of the workers with less than eight years experience had incomplete
primary schooling.
16  In table 4, the coefficients on Forms 3-4 are lower for manufacturing in the LFSs than for all wage
employees.
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category. Private rates of return make allowance for private direct costs. Social rates of return
include public direct costs. 
Full returns allowing for direct costs are generally very different from Mincerian returns (Table
7) refers. For post-primary education, the returns - particularly social returns - are markedly lower
- often only half as large. However at the primary level, full returns far exceed Mincerian returns.
This is because we replace the Mincerian assumption that young children forgo adult wages to
attend school with the assumption that there is no opportunity cost to their time. Since direct
costs to primary school are very low, this produces  high (25%) private returns to primary school
and reasonable social returns (13%) despite the wage benefits to primary education having fallen
to very low levels by 1995 (a Mincerian return of only 2%). Social returns are always lower than
private returns by construction. The difference is most marked at the university level and least
pronounced at the secondary level. By 1995, private and social returns to secondary schooling
are very close, due to the relatively modest public contribution to costs. Both the private and
social returns to secondary schooling  have fallen by more than two-thirds between 1978 and
1995
14. By 1995, the private and social returns to secondary schooling were 6-7%. This is below
the 10% figure often referred to  - for example, by Psacharopoulos (1994) - as the discount rate
for government projects. By contrast, the private returns to university education in 1995 are very
large - 35% -  whilst social returns are reasonable, at 17%. These figures for manufacturing
workers are similar to those for all employees in 1986. It is hard to compare these figures with
LFS 1978 because of the biases in the estimates of the wage premium for university graduates.
However, it seems likely that the returns to university education have risen. This is partly due to
the rise in the wage premium for university graduates and, in the case of social returns, due to the
sharp fall in direct costs per student. Nonetheless, caution is required in drawing conclusions
about the RORE at the university level because of the small number of graduates sampled.
Table 7 also presents estimates of the returns to incremental increases in education. Primary
education appears to pay off mainly after Standard 4, often thought to be the minimum required
for functional literacy. This suggests that reducing dropouts from primary schooling may have a
good return. This is still a policy issue in Kenya where dropping out of primary school remains
common, despite high primary school enrolment rates. However, the above evidence may not be
particularly relevant here, since very few recent entrants to wage employment have less than four
standards of primary schooling
15. With secondary schooling in 1978 and 1986, moving from
Forms 1-2 to Forms 3-4 appears twice as remunerative as moving from primary completion to
Forms 1-2. This is not true in the 1995 RPED, although this may  represent a difference between
returns in manufacturing and outside of manufacturing rather than a change over time
16. 16
Table 7: Full rates of return to education; incorporating direct costs
LFS 1978 LFS 1986 RPED 1995
Private Social Private Social Private Social
P r i m a r y 2 41 32 21 32 51 3
S e c o n d a r y  ( l o w e r )2 32 01 71 47 6
Higher secondary 28 25 20 18 NA NA
University 13 2 31 10 35 17
Incremental returns:
Primary 1-4 10 7 18 10 8 6
P r i m a r y  5 - 8 7 02 72 81 78 33 7
F o r m  1 - 2 1 51 41 08 1 08
F o r m  3 - 4 3 83 22 31 94 3
NA = not applicable (Forms 5 and 6 abolished).
We can compare the full rates of return in Table 7 with the averages for sub-Saharan Africa
reported by Psacharopoulos (1994). He reported private returns of 41% for primary, 27% for
secondary and 28% for higher education; social returns were 24%, 185 and 11% respectively. In
our data, returns to primary school throughout the period are scarcely over half the values given
by Psacharopoulos. Returns to secondary school in 1978 were of a similar magnitude to those
reported by Psacharopoulos but have since fallen to less than a third of that figure. Returns to
university education may have risen over time and are now slightly higher than Psacharopoulos￿s
estimates. Our results do not support the suggestion that the ￿conventional pattern￿ of returns -
with primary being the most profitable and university education the least - might have held in
earlier decades in Kenya. Indeed in 1978, the opposite pattern is observed. In 1986, social rates
of return were roughly comparable across different levels of education. By 1995, tertiary
education clearly has the highest return and secondary the lowest. There is a natural tendency to
make direct policy inferences from such results but it should be recalled that here we are
comparing standard rates of return, making no allowances for external or non-wage effects of
education.
6.  Expected returns to education; incorporating self-employment 
The above calculations are limited by being based on samples of wage earners only. Calculating
the effect of education on the expected income of urban residents in general provides a broader
picture of the benefits of education. In this section, we calculate expected incomes for individuals
with differing levels of education but otherwise identical characteristics.  In addition to earnings
functions for wage employees, this requires us to estimate earnings functions for the self-
employed and multinomial logit models for whether an individual is employed or self-employed.17 Our concept of an expected return is analogous to the Mincerian rate of return, not the full rate of
return, since we do not allow for direct costs. Focussing on expected returns requires no change in the
measurement of costs and we wish to concentrate here on how it changes the measurement of the benefits of
education.
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We are only able to do this for 1978 and 1986, since our data for 1995 is for wage employees
only.
The Mincerian returns to schooling for the self-employed in 1978 are strikingly similar to those
for wage employees (Table 8 refers). Returns to primary schooling in self-employment are 9%
compared to 8% for wage employees; returns to lower secondary schooling are 40% compared
to 42%. Returns to secondary schooling for the self-employed fall sharply to only 15% in 1986.
This is much lower than return for wage employees in general, but very similar to the 16% figure
estimated for manufacturing wage employees. One might speculate that the returns for the self-
employed and manufacturing wage employees are quicker to respond to changes in market
conditions, perhaps because they are more exclusively outside the public sector. The Mincerian
returns to primary schooling in self-employment were fairly stable between 1978 and 1986, if
anything rising slightly. There are too few university graduates in self-employment in the surveys
to be very confident about the return to tertiary education. However, those observed in 1986
earned substantially more than less educated workers, ceteris paribus (a Mincerian rate of return
of 65%). 
The probabilities of  individuals being in employment or self-employment are predicted using
multinomial logit models. Along with education, the other explanatory variables were a cubic term
in experience together with dummy variables for residence in Nairobi and Mombasa. The logits
were estimated separately for men and for women. Full results of the multinomial logits are not
presented here but are available from the authors on request. Instead, we report how the
probabilities of being in wage employment and self-employment predicted by the models vary with
education (Table 9 refers). We focus on predictions for an individual with sixteen years of
experience, not resident in either Nairobi or Mombasa. Education generally raises the probability
of employment for both sexes in both 1978 and 1986. It has some tendency to reduce the
probability of self-employment, but the rises in employment probabilities are mainly mirrored in
the fall in the probability of being neither employed nor self-employed. The patterns are strongest
for women: in 1986, those with Form 3-4 have an 84% probability of being in wage or self-
employment; those with no education have only a 36% probability.
By comparing differentials in expected earnings for representative workers with different levels
of education, we can calculate expected returns to education
17. For men, expected earnings are
generally similar to the conventional Mincerian returns from wage employment. Consequently,
standard estimates of the rates of return, based only on earnings profiles for wage employees, are
close to expected rates of return. This result is consistent with the predictions of competitive
labour markets. For women, expected rates of return to education differ substantially. This is
particularly marked in the case of lower secondary schooling (Form 4), where the expected rate
of return far exceeds the conventional one because of the positive effect of secondary schooling
on women￿s employment probabilities.18
Table 8: Earnings functions for the self-employed





















































no. of  observations 254 629
mean lnw  7.401 7.297
primary ROR 9.1 12.4
secondary ROR 40.0 14.9
7. Conclusions
We have estimated conventional rates of return to education in Kenya for surveys from the mid-
70s, mid-80s and mid-90s. These are most interesting at the secondary level. Between 1978 and
1995, both social and private returns to secondary education appear to have fallen by more than
two-thirds. This is driven almost exclusively by a narrowing of the wage premium to secondary
educated workers; direct costs have remained fairly constant. The social returns to  secondary
education in 1995 appear modest at around 6-7% compared to a healthy 20% in 1978. At the
primary level, conventional estimates are of largely historic interest because almost no workers19
in recent cohorts are uneducated. However, the wage benefits of primary education do appear to
have fallen sharply, although this has not led to a fall in social returns since direct costs have fallen
correspondingly. At the university level, the small numbers of graduates in the samples and other
data problems make one cautious about the reliability of the estimates. Although the estimates for
university education must be regarded with caution, there is no evidence of a marked fall in
returns at that level - if anything, the opposite is true. Returns, particularly private returns, in 1986
and in 1995 were high. This may help to explain the strong political pressure within the country
in the late 1980s to expand university education.
For 1978 and 1986, we were able to generalise our analysis to include self-employment as well
as wage employment. This allowed us to calculate an expected rate of return that took into
account the effect of education on access to employment and returns within self-employment. For
men, the expected rate of return to education did not differ too much from the conventional
Mincerian rate of return, partly because wage employment is the most common activity for men
and partly because there did appear to be returns to education in self-employment. However, the
decline in the expected return to secondary schooling between 1978 and 1986 was larger than the
decline in the standard Mincerian return because the returns to secondary schooling fell much
more in self-employment than in wage employment. For women, expected rates of return are
much higher than standard Mincerian returns, although this is driven by imputing zero value to
activities outside of employment and self-employment.
Table 9: Expected earnings by education
a) Men
Wage Employment Self-employment Expected
earnings
Rate of return
Probability Earnings Probability Earnings Mincerian Expected
LFS 1978
Uneducated 67 1041 22 1630 1057 - -
Primary completer 77 1650 16 2074 1602 8 7
Secondary 
Form 4
83 4220 13 6694 4373 39 43
Secondary
Form 6
81 6993 18 12772 8558 33 48
University
graduate
85 12352 14 12760 13910 19 16
LFS 1986
Uneducated 63 830 25 814 726 -
Primary completer 73 1297 20 1487 1244 8 10
Secondary 
Form 4
82 2797 14 2232 2606 29 27
Secondary 
Form 6
90 4892 9 2690 4645 37 39
University
graduate
74 9676 26 9705 9684 24 2720
b) Women
Wage Employment Self-employment Expected
earnings
Rate of return
Probability Earnings Probability Earnings Standard Expected
LFS 1978
Uneducated 13 992 29 996 418 - -
Primary
completer
21 1573 22 1268 609 8 7
Secondary 
Form 4
72 4022 5 4093 3100 39 102
Secondary 
Form 6
63 6665 8 7809 4824 33 28
University
graduate
- 11773 - 7801 - 21 -
LFS 1986
Uneducated 10 747 26 520 210 - -
Primary
completer
23 1167 30 950 531 8 22
Secondary 
Form 4
70 2519 14 1426 1963 29 55
Secondary 
Form 6
84 4405 6 1719 3803 37 47
University
graduate
88 8712 9 6201 8225 24 29
Evaluating for a person with 16 years potential experience, not in Nairobi or Mombassa.
Expected rate of return is the premia in expected earnings for a year of education
One must be wary of deriving policy implications from estimates of the conventional rates of
return to education. Like most of the literature, we do not control for many unobservables that
may be correlated with education; nor do we consider non-monetary or external benefits to
education. Nonetheless, the above results do suggest that patterns of rates of returns prevailing
in the 1970s cannot be assumed to hold in the 1990s. This conclusion may well be true of  African
countries other than Kenya which have also expanded educational access but experienced
economic decline. It is possible that our results reflect a declining quality of secondary education.
However, we are unconvinced by this explanation: expenditure per student fell less at the
secondary level than at other levels whilst class sizes did not increase. Moreover, all cohorts
suffered a fall in the return to education, not just the most recent. It is true that the oldest cohorts
- those educated before the 1970s - still appear to receive substantial returns but this can be
explained by their  having secured higher paying occupations that are more scarce for recent
cohorts. We are also sceptical that our results reflect a lower value of secondary education a
signal of student ability. Knight and Sabot (1990) found pre-school ability to play relatively little
role in determining the return to secondary education in 1980. Furthermore, for 1978, we found21
substantial returns to secondary education in self-employment, a sector where signalling
presumably plays no role. Instead, perhaps the most plausible interpretation of the fall in the
returns to lower secondary is that it illustrates the most basic principle of economics: the value
of scarcity. 
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